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ABSTRACT
Thispaper analyzes the way in which the earnings of the immigrant
population may be expected to differ from the earnings of the native
population because of the endogeneity of the migration decision. The
conditions that determine the nature of the self—selection are derived
and depend on economic and political characteristics of the sending
and receiving countries. The empirical analysis shows that
differences in the U.S. earnings of immigrants with the same measured
skills, but from different home countries, are attributable to
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This paper analyzes the way in which the earnings
of the immigrant population may be expected to differ
from the earnings, of the native population because of
the endogeneity of the decision to migrate. The empir-
ical study shows that differences in the U.S. earnings
of immigrants with the same measured skills, but from
different home countries, are attributable to variations
in political and economic conditions in the countries of
origin at the time of migration.
Immigrants in the United States do not make up a random sample of the
population from the countries of origin. This is perhaps the most convincing
finding in the literature that analyzes how immigrants perform in the U.S. labor
market. In the "first-generation" studies of this literature (Barry R. Chiswick,
1978; Geoffrey Carliner, 1980; Gregory DeFreitas, 1980), cross-section earnings
functions were estimated and two conclusions were reached: (1) the age/earnings
profile of immigrants is steeper than the age/earnings profile of the native
population; and (2) the age/earnings profile of immigrants crosses the age/
earnings profile of natives about 10-15 years after immigration. Thus, after
a relatively short adaptation period immigrant earnings "overtake" the earn-
ings of the native-born. The first of these findings was often explained in
terms of the human capital framework: Immigrants presumably have stronger
investment incentives than native workers, and thus immigrant earnings grow2
at a faster rate than native earnings. The existence of the overtaking age,
however, was explained in terms of the unobserved characteristics of the
migrants: Immigrants are a self-selected group and, as a result, immigrants
may be "more able and more highly motivated" (Chiswick, 1978, P. 900) than the
native-born.
Recently, the focus has shifted from analyses of single cross-section
data sets to studies of cohort or longitudinal data (see my 1985 and 1987
papers; and Guillermina Jasso and Nark R. Rosenzweig, 1985, 1986). The de-
parture point for these studies is the well-known fact that the analysis of a
single cross-section of data cannot separately identify aging and cohort
1 . . . .. effects. The cross-section finding that immigrant earnings and years-since-
migration are positively correlated can be explained either in terms of an
aging effect (i.e. ,assimilation)or it may be due to cohort differences in
quality (caused by non-random return migration propensities and/or secular
shifts in the skill mix of immigrants admitted to the United States). These
recent studies, in effect, bring to the forefront the question of how cohort
quality and immigrant self-selection are related. For example, are immi-
grants selected from the upper or lower tail of the ability (or income) dis-
tribution in the sending countries? Even if immigrants are drawn from the
upper tail of the income distribution in the home country, does that ensure
that they end up in the upper tail of the U.S. income distribution? Finally,
if cohort quality has experienced a secular decline in the postwar period, as
my 1985 analysis suggests, what factors are responsible for this change in the
selection mechanism determining immigration?
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical study of these questions.
It is assumed that individuals compare the potential incomes in the United
States with the incomes in the home countries, and make the migration decision3
based on these income differentials (net of mobility costs). The use of this
standard model allows a systematic analysis of the types of selection biases
that are created by this behavior.2 It will be seen that the common assumption
that immigrants are drawn from the upper tail of the "home" income distribution
requires a set of conditions that will not be generally satisfied. More
importantly, this type of model suggests a few key variables (namely, the
characteristics of the relevant income distributions) that "predictt' the
types of selection biases created by income-maximizing behavior on the part
of potential migrants.
The empirical work presented in this paper analyzes the U.S. earnings of
immigrants from 41 countries using the 1970 and 1980 Censuses. Not surpris-
ingly, it is found that the variance in (relative) immigrant earnings across
these countries is substantial. Using the theoretical insights, however, the
analysis shows that the variance in various measures of the "quality" of
immigrants can be explained to a large extent by a few key variables describing
economic and political conditions in the countries of origin.
I.Theoretical Framework
Suppose there are two countries: country 0 and country 1. For concrete-
ness, country 0 denotes the "home" country or the country of origin while
country 1 denotes the United States or the country of destination.3 Residents
of the home country have earnings which are distributed as:
(1) 2nw0p0+c0
where e0N(0,cj). The earnings facing this population if they were to migrate
to the United States are given by:
(2) £n w1 = +'
wherec1N(0,cr), and and have correlation coefficient p.4
Equations (1) and (2) describe the earnings distributions facing a given
individual that is contemplating emigration to the United States. This frame-
work, due to A.D. Roy (1951), can be interpreted as decomposing individual
earnings into a part due to observable socioeconomic variables (p0 and
and a part due to unobserved characteristics (andc1). The Roy model
focuses on the impact of selection biases on the disturbances and
Initially, therefore, variations in socioeconomic variables (which shift
and p) are ignored, but their role will be discussed below.4
The parameter p is the mean income that residents from the home country
would earn in the U.S. if all home country citizens were to migrate to the
United States. In general, this level of income need not be the same as that
of the U.S. native population since the average skills of the two popula-
tions -evenin the absence of selection biases -maydiffer. For simplicity,
in the remainder of the discussion it is assumed that these intercountry dif-
ferences in skill (such as education and age) have been standardized, and
hence also gives the earnings of the average native worker in the U.S.5
The migration decision for persons in country 0 is determined by the sign
of the index function:
(3) =
w+C 1P0 + (c1-c0)
where C gives the level of mobility costs, and 7t gives a "time-equivalent"
measure of the costs of emigrating to the United States (i.e., it =C/w0).
Assume that it is constant across all individuals in the country of origin.
Since migration to the U.S. occurs when 1>0, the emigration rate from the
country of origin is given by:
(4) P =Pr[v> =
wherevc1-e0; z =-(p1-p0-it)/a;andis the standard normal distribution
function.5
Equation (4) neatly summarizes the economic content of the theory of
migration proposed by Larry A. Sjaastad (1962). If follows from (4) that the
emigration rate is: (a) a negative function of mean income in the home country;
(b) a positive function of mean income in the United States; and (c) anega-
tive function of the costs of emigrating to the United States. Thereare,
however, a number of other implications in the theory that yield important
insights into the kinds of selection biases generated by the endogenous migra-
tion decision. In particular, consider the conditional means E(2nw011>O) and
E(n w111>O). The first of these means gives the average earnings of emigrants
in the country of origin, while the latter term gives the average earnings of
these migrants in the United States. Under the normality assumptions these
conditional means are given by:





(6) E(.Qn w1II>0) = + 1(J -
V 0
where X =4(z)/P;andis the density of the standard normal. The variable X
is inversely related to the emigration rate, and takes on a value of zero when
P1 (Heckman, 1979). Assume initially that P<1 so that at least part of the
home country's population is better off by not emigrating. Then the second
terms in (5) and (6) define the kinds of selection biases generated by income-
maximizing behavior. Equation (5) shows that the average emigrant may be
?tbettert or "worse" than the average person in the country of origin depending
on p G/a.Similarly,equation (6) shows that the average immigrant in the
U.S. may have higher or lower earnings than the average nativeperson depending
on cT1/cr0p. Let Q0 be the income differential between the average emigrant and6
the average person in country 0, Q1 be the income differential between the
average immigrant and the average native person in the United States, and
k = Thereare three cases that are ofinterest:6
Case 1. Positive Selection: Q0>O and Q1>O.
In this situation the "best" persons leave the country of origin and when
they get to the U.S. they outperform the native population. A reading of the
literature on the earnings of immigrants suggests that this positive selection
is most often assumed iiitheinterpretation of those empirical results. Inspec-
tion of equations (5) and (6), however, shows that the necessary (and sufficient)
conditions for positive selection to occur are:
.1
(7) p >mln(k,
k) and k >1.
Thus if p is sufficiently high and if income is more dispersed in the U.S.
than in the country of origin, the immigrants arriving in the U.S. are indeed
selected from the upper tail of the home country's income distribution and
will outperform the native-born.
Case 2.Negative Selection: Q0<O and Q1<0.
In this type of selection the U.S. draws persons from the lower tail of
the home country's income distribution and these immigrants do not perform
well in the U.S. labor market. The necessary (and sufficient) conditions for
negative selection to occur are:
(8) p >min(,
k) and k <1.
Negative selection again requires that p be "sufficiently" positive but that
the income distribution be more unequal in the home country that in the U.S.77
Case 3.Refugee Sorting: Q0<O and Q1>O.
The U.S. draws below-average immigrants (in terms of thecountry of
origin), but they outperform the U.S. native-born upon arrival. Thenecessary
(and sufficient) condition for this to occur is:
(9) p < min(, k)
These three cases summarize the quality differentials between migrants
and the native base in each of the two countries. It seems plausible toargue
that for non-Communist countries p is likely to be positive and large. After
all, profit-maximizing employers are likely to value the same factors inany
market economy. The quality of immigrants in the United States then depends
entirely on the ratio of variances in the income distributions of the United
States and the country of origin. Suppose, for example, that > cT. The
United States, in a sense, "insures" low-income workers againstpoor labor
market outcomes while "taxing" high-income workers (relative to thecountry
of origin). This opportunity set implies that low-income workers have much
greater incentives to migrate than high-income workers, and thus leads to
immigrants being negatively selected from the population. Conversely, if
> a, the home country now protects low-income workers frompoor labor
market outcomes and "taxes" the high income worker. Thisopportunity set
generates a "brain drain" into the United States. Available data on the
distribution of income (World Bank, 1986, pp. 226-227)suggests that income
is more unequally distributed in the large number of "third-world" countries
(e.g., Mexico, India, etc.) which form the bulk of current immigration to the
U.S.8 Incomemaximizing behavior is inconsistent with the traditional assump-
tion that the U.S. draws the "best" workers from a givencountry and that those
workers will (eventually) outperform the U.S. native-born.8
On the other hand, p need not always be positive and strong. It is
likely, in fact, that p is negative for countries that have recently expe-
rienced a Communist takeover. The change from a market economy to a Communist
system is often accompanied by structural shifts in the income distribution
and, in particular, the confiscation of the financial holdings of entrepre-
neurs. Imigrants from such systems will be in the lower tail of the "revolu-
tionary't income distribution but will outperform the average U.S. native
worker. This result signals the movement of persons who cannot match with
the new political structure, but who "seek refuge" and match quite well in a
market economy.
These insights are developed under the assumption that selection biases
do exist (i.e., P<l and X>O). Since for most countries in Latin America and
Asia the mean level of the U.S. income distribution greatly exceeds the mean
level of the home country's income distribution, it is unclear why --inthe
context of an income-maximizing model --theentire population of country 0
does not emigrate to the United States.
There are two reasons why we do not observe wholesale migrations of
entire populations to the United States. First, it is not the differences in
mean income levels that determine the extent of migration, but the differences
in mean income levels net of migration costs. These migration costs will be
both monetary and psychic, and are likely to be large in countries which have
different cultural and social backgrounds than the United States. Second,
there are statutory restrictions on the number of legal immigrants the U.S.
will accept from any given country. These quotas play the important role of
increasing migration costs for emigrants (if the numerical constraints are
binding) since these individuals will presumably have to compete (and invest
time and effort) to obtain the relatively scarce visas. Hence mobility costs9
ensure that only some persons in country 0 find it worthwhile to emigrate and
thereby create the selection biases that are apparent in immigration data.
The model outlined above can be used to infer how the quality of immi-
grants in the United States will differ in the cross-section (across different
countries of origin) or over time (as economic conditions in the country of
origin and in the U.S. change). The income-maximization hypothesis implies
the existence of a quality-of-immigrants equation given by:
(10) '1 =Q1(J1-p0-Tc,a0,cr1,p)
To determine the restrictions implied by the behavioral assumption of income
a0a1
maximization it is instructive to recall that Q1 =yX,where y = (k-p).
The parameter y does not depend on the size of the flow, while X does. The
impact of any variable a on the quality of immigrants in the U.S. is given by:
(11) __i=X1+
aa
The first term in (11) holds the size of the flow constant and will be called
the ttcompositiont? effect. It measures how a change in the ability mix of a
constant-sized immigrant pool affects their quality (relative to the U.S.
native population). The second term in (11) will be called the "scale' effect
and captures what happens to the quality of U.S. immigrants as the size of the
flow is increased for any given ttmixt? (i.e., for constant y).
Consider what happens to immigrant quality as the mean of the home countryt s
income distribution increases. It can be shown that:
(12) (k-p)
.
Shiftsin p0 lead only to a scale effect on Q1. In addition, it is easy to
show that aX/az>0.9 As discussed earlier, the sign of k-p determines whether
immigrants fall in the upper or lower tail of the U.S. income distribution.10
Equation (12) shows that k-p also determines what happens to the (U.S.) earn-
ings of immigrants as mean income in the home country increases. If k-p is
negative (immigrants are coming from countries with significantly more unequal
income distributions and p is "sufficiently" positive), aQ1/ap0<0. The intui-
tion for this result follows from the fact that as p0 increases the emigration
rate falls. The increase in p0 improves the position of the "marginal" imini-
grant so that he no longer migrates. But this marginal immigrant was more
productive than the average immigrant. The increase in therefore, leads
to a reduction in the average quality of the immigrant population. Since the
mean of the home country's income distribution and mobility costs play identical
roles in the model, equation (12) also predicts that increases in mobility
costs will decrease immigrant quality if k-p<0.
It is important to note that this result only captures the impact of
changes in p (or migration costs) on the extent of selection bias (Q). The
increase in p, however, can be induced by either a shift in the skill distri-
bution of the country of origin's population, or by an increase in the country's
wealth that is unrelated to skills (e.g., the discovery of a large inventory
of natural resources). If p0 shifts because of the latter factor, equation
(12) correctly predicts the change in observed immigrant earnings (which are
given by p1 +Q1).However, if p0 shifts due to an increase in the skill
level of the population, the change in immigrant earnings will also depend on
the term dp1/dp0. This derivative will be positive if skills are transferable
across countries, and this skill shift may dominate the selection bias effect
given by (12). Hence the (relative) earnings of immigrants in the U.S. may
well be a positive function ofp0 regardless of the sign of equation(12).10
The change in the quality of immigrants due to a mean-preserving increase





where the first term gives the composition effect and the second term gives
the scale effect. Since IpI<1, the composition effect will always be non-
positive. An increase in a0 reduces the income of the poorest while it im-
proves the position of the richest. Hence the mix of immigrants will include
more persons from the lower tail of the distribution.
In addition, a change in o changes the rate of emigration. Equation
(13) shows that the sign of the scale effect depends on the sign of three terms:
(k-p), (1-pk) and z. The first two of these terms are nothing but the restric-
tions in equations (7) and (8). Suppose, for concreteness, that there is nega-
tive selection: the least able persons leave the home country and they perform
below the U.S. native average. This implies k-p<0 and 1-pk>O. Inspection of
(13) reveals that the direction of the scale effect depends on the sign of z
>+ It, sothat mean U.S. incomes are higher than
foreign incomes even after adjusting for mobility costs, z is negative, the
scale effect is negative and thus immigrants from countries with more income
inequality will perform worse in the United States.
The intuition for the workings of the scale effect can be grasped by
considering Figure 1, which is drawn with z<0 and ci1<cj0. As a increases, the
worse-off persons in country 0 will still want to migrate, while the better
off persons become relatively better off and their migration incentives de-
cline. The emigration rate drops due to the withdrawal of the ?best?t poten-
tial migrants from the market, and thus the quality of the pooi that does
reach the United States declines.
The last characteristic of the home country's income distribution which
determines the quality of immigrants is p.It can be shown that:12
aQi ____ a2o ax (14) =- (1-pk)X+1
(k-p) z
Changes in the correlation coefficient also induce two effects. Consider
first the composition effect. Its sign depends on -(1-pk), which is negative
if there is negative selection. An increase in p implies that a better match
exists between performance in the U.S. and in the home country. Since
this decreases the profitability of migration for the best persons in country
oandincreases it for the worst persons.
In addition, changes in p have an impact on the emigration rate, and the
scale effect is given by the last term in (14). If the conditions for negative
selection hold, k-p<O and the sign of the scalie effect will depend on the sign
of -z. If, as before, we assume z<O, the scale effect of an increase in the
correlation coefficient on the quality of immigrants is seen to be positive.
A summary of the comparative statics results under the various regimes is
provided in Table 1. One implication is immediately clear: generalizations
about the quality of immigrants in the United States are hard to come by. The
model does, however, isolate the key factors that determine the types of
selections in the immigrant population and these factors shed some light on my
1985 finding that the quality of immigrants declined in the postwar period.
Prior to the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, immigra-
tion to the United States from Eastern Hemisphere countries was regulated by
numerical quotas. These quotas were based on the ethnic population of the
United States in 1919 and thus encouraged immigration from (some) Western
European countries and discouraged immigration from all other countries. The
favored countries have one important characteristic: their income distribu-
tions are probably much less dispersed than those of countries in Latin
America or Asia. The 1965 Amendments revamped the quota system, established a13
20,000 numerical limit for immigration from any single country (subject to
both Hemispheric and worldwide numerical limits), and led to a substantial
increase in the number of immigrants from Asia and Latin America. The new
flow of migrants originate in countries that are much more likely to have
greater income inequality than the United States. It would not be surprising,




The quality measure Q1 derived in the previous section is the standardized
wage differential between immigrants and natives in the U.S. In any given
cross-section, this wage differential is affected by two factors:(1) differ-
ences in the skill composition of the various immigrant cohorts; and (2) the
rate of convergence between foreign- and native-born earnings (i.e., the rate
of assimilation of immigrants). An empirical framework for measuring these
effects thus begins with the specification of the regression model:
(15) n w.(T) =X.OT
+ÔL+c1Iyj
+
+I.C. ÷I.C ÷ v. lii 2ii 1'
wherew.(T) is the wage rate of individual i in cross-section year T; X1
is a vector of socioeconomic characteristics; I. is a dummy variable set
to unity if the individual is foreign-born; represents the number of years
the immigrant has resided in the United States; and C is the calendar year
of the immigrantts arrival. The parameters a1 and a2 capture the impact of
assimilation on the (relative) earnings of immigrants, whileand 2 capture
12 the cohort differentials.
Of course, in a single cross-section of data equation (15) cannot be
estimated since the variables C. and y. are related by the identity TC1 +y1.
Substituting this identity in (15) yields:14
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Equation(16) shows that the typical cross-section earnings function esti-
mated in the immigration literature does not identify a single parameter of
interest)3 It iseasy to show, however, that if another cross-section is
available in calendar year T' all the parameters in (15) can be identified.14
Noreover, the comparison of the two cross-section regressions provides inter-
esting insights about the extent and direction of cohort quality differentials.
Let =1T2T2,y2 =c1-1-22T,
and =a2+2,
be the coefficients of
the immigration variables in the cross-section at calendar year T. This vector




The immigration vector in cross-section earnings functions (except for the
coefficient of Iy2) is inherently unstable, though the direction of the
instability provides insights into the underlying structural changes. For
instance, (the coefficient of the immigrant dummy) will be shifting down
over time if the quality of immigrants is decreasing at the "margin" (i.e., in
the cross-section year T). In addition, the age/earnings profile of immi-
grants (relative to natives) becomes steeper over time (i.e., 2 increases) if
the decline in the quality of immigrant cohorts has accelerated over the
sample period.15
The empirical analysis below uses the 1970 and 1980 Census cross—sections
to identify the parameters of interest (ô,ci1,a2,1, and From these
estimates it is possible to calculate measures of three alternative dimensions
of cohort quality that underlie the discussion. The first of these dimensions
is simply the wage of an immigrant cohort relative to the native base prior to
any assimilation taking place; i.e., a measure of the ttrawtt skills a given
immigrant cohort brings to the United States. A second dimension is given by
the extent to which the quality of successive immigrant cohorts is changing
over time, while a third dimension is given by the extent to which the earn-
ings of a specific immigrant cohort grow--above and beyond pure aging effects--
in the U.S. labor market. Clearly, there are many ways of defining variables
that capture these three facets of the "quality" of immigrants. However,
since all possible definitions of a particular dimension of quality are based
on the same underlying parameters, there is a high degree of correlation among
the alternative measures. Thus, to some extent, the choice of the empirical
representation of a given facet of quality is arbitrary. In the empirical
analysis below, the three dimensions of quality are defined by:
1.The predicted wage differential in 1979 between the most recently
arrived immigrant cohort and the native base. This measure of the quality of
a single cohort of immigrants--prior to assimilation taking place --isgiven
by the coefficient of the immigrant dummy variable in the 1980 cross-section.
2.The rate of wage growth (relative to natives) for an immigrant cohort
that has resided in the United States for 10 years. This is the assimilation
effect evaluated at y =10,and is given by a.Qnw/aI..10 = + 20a2.
3.The predicted wage differential immediately after immigration be-
tween the 1979 cohort and the 1955 cohort. This measure of the extent of
cohort quality change is designed to compare the typical immigrant that16
migrated prior to the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act with the typical
immigrant from the most recent wave. Using equation (15) it is easy to show
that this change in cohort quality is given by 24(, +22T
-242),where T
indexes the 1980 cross-section.
III. Regression Results from the 1970—1980 Censuses
The data are drawn from the 1970 2/100 U.S. Census (obtained by pooling
the 5% SNSA and County Group Sample and the 5% State Sample) and the 1980
5/100 A Sample.15 The complete samples are used in the creation of the immi-
grant extracts, but random samples are drawn for the native "baseline't popula-
tion.16 The analysis is restricted tomen aged 25-64 who satisfied four
sample selection rules: (1) the individual was employed in the calendar year
prior to the Census; (2) the individual was not self-employed or working
without pay; (3) the individual was not in the Armed Forces (as of the survey
week); and (4) the individual did not reside in group quarters.17
Since labor market conditions changed substantially between 1970 and
1980, the empirical framework derived in the previous section focused on the
behavior of immigrant earnings relative to the earnings of natives. In this
paper all immigrant groups will be compared to a single native base: the
group of white, non-Hispanic, non-Asian men.
Forty-one countries were chosen for analysis. The countries were selected
on the basis that both the 1970 and 1980 Censuses contained a substantial
number of immigrants from that country. In particular, it is necessary to
have at least 80 observations of persons born in a particular foreign country
in the pooled 2/100 1970 Census to enter the sample of the 41 countries.'8
The 41 countries under analysis account for 90.4 percent of all immigration to
the U.S. between 1951 and 1980.17
Summary statistics on the immigrant flow in the 1951-1980 period are
presented in Table 2. The first column of Table 2 gives the total number of
immigrants from each country that arrived in the United States in that period.
Although this number is interesting, it is more instructive if it is converted
into a percentage of the country of origin's 1980 population. This statistic
is presented in column 2 and gives the percentage by which the country of
origin's population would increase (in 1980) if all the persons who emigrated
to the United States in the past three decades returned to their birthplace.
This percent ranges from the trivially small (.04 percent of Brazil and the
USSR) to the amazingly large (over 10 percent for Jamaica). Of the 41 coun-
tries in Table 2, 17 of them experienced emigation to the United States which
exceeded 1 percent of that country's population.
The national composition of the flows received by the United States over
the 1951-1980 period did not remain constant over the three decades. Column 3
gives the flow of immigrants in the 1951-1960 decade as a percent of the
country's 1950 population; while column 4 presents the flow of immigrants in
1971—1980 as a percent of the country's 1970 population. These statistics
document the declining importance of Western European countries as a source of
immigrants and the increasing importance of Asia and Latin America. The fact
that the characteristics of the sending countries changed drastically during
the postwar period implies that the types of selections that distinguish the
immigrant population from the native-born also changed.
The 1970 and 1980 cross-section regressions were jointly estimated in
each of the 41 samples (i.e., the group of immigrants from a specific country
of origin pooled with the "white" native base), using the (2n) wage rate in
the year preceding the census as the dependent variable. The socioeconomic
vector of characteristics X included: years of completed schooling, age, age18
squared, whether health limits work, whether married, spouse present, and
whether resident of an SNSA. The regression framework derived in Section II
implies that the coefficient of the quadratic years-since-migration variable
should be constant across Censuses. This restriction was satisfied (at the 10
percent level of significance) by 32 of the 41 countries in the data, and
hence was imposed on the analysis.
The restricted coefficients of the immigration vector in both the 1970
and 1980 Census cross-sections are presented in the first five columns of
Table 3. The coefficients of the immigration variables in 1970 differ drasti-
cally from the coefficients of the immigration variables in 1980. This dif-
ference implies that cross-section regressions do not capture the "true"
assimilation impact since cohort effects are confounding the analysis. Con-
sider, for example, Colombia. In 1970, the most recent immigrants earned
about 22 percent less than the native base, and their (relative) earnings
increased by about 1.7 percent in the first year after immigration. By 1980,
the most recent wave of Colombians earned 40 percent less than the same native
base, and their earnings increased by about 2.2 percent in the firstyear
after immigration. The tilting of the cross-section profile so that later
cross—sections are steeper and have a more negative constant term implies that
the quality of the more recent Colombian immigrant waves is lower than that of
the earlier waves. Conversely, consider the immigrants from France. In 1970,
the typical French immigrant earned about 8 percent less than a comparable
native person, and had earnings growth of about .2 percent during that first-
year after immigration. By 1980, the most recent immigrant earned about 10
percent more than the native base, and had earnings growth of minus .5 percent
during that first year. The flattening of the cross-section profile implies
that the quality of French immigrants increased over the sample period.19
Three dimensions of cohort quality are implicit in these regression
coefficients. The entry wage differential between the 1979 immigrant cohort
and the native base is given by the coefficient of the immigrant dummy in the
1980 Census cross-section. Table 3 clearly shows that this coefficient has a
large variance across countries. The last two columns of Table 3 present
estimates of the other two dimensions of cohort quality: the assimilation
rate defined by the slope of the earnings/assimilation path at y =10;and the
rate of change in cohort quality, defined by the earnings differential between
the 1979 cohort and the 1955 cohort at the time of arrival in the U.S. Since
these estimated parameters are functions of the cross-section coefficients of
Table 3, it is not surprising to find that there is a lot of variance in both
of these variables across countries. Immigrants from some countries have high
assimilation rates, while immigrants from other countries experience no assimi-
lation at all. Similarly, the rate of cohort quality change is sometimes
positive (thus indicating quality increased between the 1955 and 1979 cohorts)
and sometimes negative (thus indicating a quality decrease across cohorts).
For example, the most recent immigrant wave from the United Kingdom has an
earnings potential that is about 13 percent higher that the wave that arrived
in 1955, while the most recent immigrants from India have 28 percent lower
earnings than the earlier cohort.
The Roy model suggests that country-specific characteristics of the income
distribution (and mobility costs) determine the quality of immigrants in the
United States. The important task, therefore, becomes the identification of
observable variables which can proxy for these theoretical parameters, and
the determination of whether these country-specific variables "explain" the
variance in the quality proxies presented in Table 3.20
IV. Determinants of Immigrant Quality
Table 4 describes the construction and source of country-specific aggre-
gate variables which portray the political and economic conditions (as well as
some characteristics of the immigrant populations) of the 41 countries under
analysis during the 1950-1979 period. Table 4 also presents the mean and
range of these variables and comparable statistics for the U.S.
Three of these variables are designed to capture political conditions in
the country of origin. These political measures are obtained from the Cross-
National Time-Series Archive (CNTSA), a historical dataset containing both
political and economic variables for all sovereign countries since 1815 (up to
1973).19 The CNTSA set contains a variable describing the extent of "party
legitimacy", i.e., whether or not there is competition among political parties
in the electoral system. The measure of party legitimacy is interpreted as an
index of political freedom, and is used to construct two variables: (1) a
dummy variable set equal to unity if the immigrant's birthplace had a competi-
tive political system during the entire 1950-1973 period; and (2) a dummy
variable set equal to unity if the immigrant's birthplace had a competitive
political system at the beginning of the period, but lost its political freedom
by the end of the period. The omitted dummy variable indicates whether the
birthplace of the immigrant had a noncompetitive political system both at the
beginning and at the end of the 1950-1973 period.20 The last index of political
stability used is a variable measuring the number of political assassinations
(defined as a politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high
government official or politician) that took place in the specific country
during the 1950-1973 period.
The country-specific vector also includes variables that describe
economic conditions in the various countries of origin:21
1.The logarithm of per capita Gross National Product in 1980 (in U.S.
dollars). In addition, the analysis also uses the average annual percentage
change in that variable over the 1963-1980 period. These variables, of course,
are designed to control for the mean level of the income distribution (as well
as changes in that level) in the various countries of origin.
2.The ratio of household income accruing to the top 10 percent of the
households to the income accruing to the bottom 20 percent of the households
(circa 1970). Unfortunately, this measure of income inequality does not exist
prior to the 1970s for most of the countries under analysis, and hence the
change in the extent of income inequality during the last three decades cannot
be documented. The empirical analysis below will proxy for the change in income
inequality by using the change in the fraction of GNP that can be attributed to
central government expenditures over that period. Presumably, the greater the
role of the government the more taxation and income redistribution that occurs,
and hence the less unequal the income distribution will be.
3.The level of mobility costs is proxied by the number of air miles
between the countryt s capital and the nearest U.S. gateway.
Finally, the regressions also include variables that describe relevant
characteristics of the immigrant population itself. The two variables in this
category are the fraction of the most recently arrived immigrants who speak
English well or very well, and the average age at migration. These variables
are likely to affect the earnings of immigrants as well as their incentives to
invest in human capital, and hence will be important determinants of immigrant
quality.
A.Determinants of the Entry Wage Differential
In the last section a variable measuring the entry wage differential22
between the foreign-born and the native-born for the immigrant cohort arriving
in 1979 was calculated for each of the 41 countries under analysis. Table 5
presents the generalized least squares regressions of this measure of immigrant
quality on the country-specific aggregate variables.2'
The simplest specification in column 1 shows that the variable measuring
whether or not the country was politically competitive in the postwar period
has a strong positive impact on the immigrant's entry wage. Immigrants from
these countries have 27 percent higher relative earnings (at the time of entry
into the U.S.) than immigrants from politically repressive countries. This
basic regression also shows that the extent of income inequality has a weak
negative impact on the relative quality of immigrants. Immigrants from coun-
tries with more income inequality are of lower quality. This result is consis-
tent with the theoretical implications of the Roy model. As income inequality
increases, the migration incentives for persons in the upper tail of the
distribution decline, thus lowering the average quality of the immigrant
population.
In the second column of Table 5, the variables measuring mobility costs
and the age and English proficiency of immigrants are added to the regression.
The results suggest that persons migrating from countries that have 100%
English proficiency rates have about 26 percent higher relative earnings at
the time of entry than immigrants from countries with 0% English proficiency
rates.22 Table 5 also shows thatage at migration has a significant negative
impact on the initial relative earnings of immigrants in the United States.
Hence persons who migrate as youths have an easier time in the U.S. labor
market than older immigrants.
The third regression in Table 5 adds the mean level of GNP per capita to
the list of exogenous variables. Its impact is strongly positive, and its23
inclusion increases the explanatory power of the regression to over 80 percent!
A 10 percent increase in a country's GNP increases the relative earnings of
immigrants by about 1.2 percent. This effect is likely to be caused by the
fact that the higher the GNP in the country of origin, the greater the resem-
blance between that country's economic structure and that of the U.S., as well
as the greater the skills of the immigrant flow. Hence immigrants from those
countries perform quite well in the U.S. labor market. The last regression in
Table 6 adds continent dummies (the omitted continent is Europe) to control
for continent-specific fixed effects. These additional controls do not have a
23 major impact on the coefficient of the other variables.
Table 5 shows that the introduction of the GNP variable has a major
impact on the coefficient of the inequality variable: the latter turns posi-
tive (and insignificant). The reason for this shift lies in the very high
negative correlation between the two variables (r =-.6).Since high-income
countries (mostly in Western Europe) also tend to have the least amount of
income inequality, the impact of per capita GNP on initial immigrant quality
is likely capturing shifts in both the mean and the variance of the country of
origin's income distribution.
The results in Table 5, therefore, are not entirely consistent with the
theoretical predictions. Note, however, that these regressions do not truly
constitute a "test" of the theory. The Roy model shows that selection biases
will depend on a number of parameters which are not directly measurable.
Table 5 attempts to explain inter-country differences in terms of variables
which supposedly proxy for these primitive concepts. Clearly the errors intro-
duced in the creation of these variables weaken the link between the theory
and the empirical work. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these few
country-specific variables "explain" a large fraction of the inter-country
differences evident in Census data.24
B.Determinants of the Rate of Assimilation
The assimilation rate is defined by the rate of earnings growth of an
immigrant cohort (relative to natives) evaluated at 10 years after immigra-
tion. Table 6 presents the regressions of this variable on the various
country-specific proxies.
Assimilation rates are determined by political factors. In particular,
immigrants from free countries have lower assimilation rates than immigrants
from countries with a long history of political repression, while immigrants
from countries that recently lost their political freedom have the highest
assimilation rates. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the
costs of return migration for immigrants from politically repressive countries
are "high", and therefore they have the most incentives to adapt to the U.S.
labor market. The same reasoning can also explain the strong positive impact
of the number of assassinations on the rate of immigrant assimilation: immi-
grants from politically unstable countries have greater incentives to assimi-
late in the U.S. labor market since their return migration may be costly.
The regression in column 2 shows that although distance between the U.S.
and the country of birth has a positive impact on the assimilation rate, the
effect is not significant. However, immigrants from countries with higher
levels of English proficiency have much higher assimilation rates. In fact,
the rate of earnings growth of immigrants from English-speaking countries is
1.4 percentage points higher than that of immigrants from countries with 0%
English proficiency rates. Similarly, the age at immigration has a strong
positive impact on assimilation rates. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis that immigrants who migrate as youths have little to gain from
assimilation p se. On the other hand, the adaptation period is likely to be
important for persons who migrate at older ages.25
The last two regressions in Table 6 add the per capita GNP variable and
the continent dummies to the list of regressors. These variables have a
significant impact on the assimilation rate (in column 4). Immigrants from
wealthier countries have higher assimilation rates, and Europeans (the omitted
continent dummy) have higher assimilation rates than immigrants from the
Americas, but lower assimilation rates than immigrants born in Asia or Africa.
Despite the strongly significant impact of the continent dummies, the qualita-
tive effect of most of the other variables in the regression is unaffected.
C.Determinants of the Change in Cohort Quality
Section III calculated a variable measuring the wage differential between
the 1979 immigrant cohort and the 1955 immigrant cohort as of the date of
immigration. The regressions analyzing the determinants of cohort quality
change are presented in Table 7. It should be noted that the specification of
these regressions differs slightly from those presented in Tables 5 and 6
since cohort quality change is likely to be determined by changes in the
explanatory variables over the 1954-1979 period.
The simple specification in column 1 reveals that cohort quality change
is strongly influenced by practically all the variables in the regressions.
For example, the quality of cohorts from countries that experienced a shift
from political competition to repression increased by about 13 percent (rela-
tive to the quality of cohorts from countries that were politically repressive
throughout the period). This effect is consistent with the implications of
the theory developed in Section I. The change in political structure can be
viewed as a change in the correlation coefficient of the earnings of indi-
viduals between the home country and the U.S. The change towards a repressive
government may make the correlation coefficient in earnings across the two26
countries negative. Thus persons in the "revolutionary" lower tail of the
home country's income distribution migrate to the U.S. and perform quite well
in the U.S. labor market.
Table 7 also shows that cohort quality change is strongly affected by the
average annual change in the percent of GNP that is attributable to expendi-
tures by the central government. Presumably the greater the role of the
government, the more income redistribution that takes place and the greater
the decrease in income inequality over the postwar period. The coefficient of
this variable in Table 8 is consistent with the theoretical implication.
The next two regressions in Table 8 introduce the (2n) level of GNP to
control for country-specific differences in wealth, and the continent dummies
to control for continent-specific fixed effects. The continent dummies are
not very significant, but the GNP variable does have a strong positive impact
on cohort quality change. Its positive coefficient confirms the finding
suggested by the descriptive analysis in Section III: the quality of immi-
grants admitted to the United States has been increasing over time when the
immigrants originate in Western Europe and has been declining over time when
the immigrants originate in the less developed countries.
One factor causing systematic quality shifts across immigrant cohorts may
have been the change in the quota system mandated by the 1965 Amendments to
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Table 4 defined a variable that measures
the change in the fraction of the home country's population "eligible" for
emigration to the United States before and after the 1965 Amendments. Higher
levels of this variable imply a reduction in the levels of "mobility costs"
faced by potential emigrants. The Roy model suggests that its impact on the
rate of cohort quality change is positive if the correlation coefficient
between earnings capacities in the two countries is positive and if income is27
more unequally distributed in the countries of origin than in the United
States. The last column of Table 7 adds the quota variable to the regression
and shows that it indeed has a positive and significant impact on the rate of
change in cohort quality. It is important to note that this regression is
estimated on only 28 observations since the quota system prior to the 1965
Amendments was applicable only to countries that were in the Eastern Hemisphere.
D.Determinants of the Emigration Rate
The empirical analysis in this paper focuses on the determinants of the
(relative) earnings of immigrants. It is worth noting, however, that the Roy
model also implies that the emigration rate will be a function of the same
characteristics of the income distribution, political conditions, and migra-
tion costs that determine the relative earnings of immigrants. Therefore, it
is important to explore if the emigration rate from the various countries of
origin is responsive to shifts in the country-specific variables that have
been used throughout this section.
Table 8 presents two probit regressions on the emigration rate.24 The
dependent variable is obtained from the second column of the summary statis-
tics presented in Table 2, and is the percentage of the country of origin's
population that emigrated to the United States in the 195 1-1980 period. The
first of the two regressions includes the political variables, the distance
variable (to measure migration costs), and the inequality variable, while the
second regression adds the continent dummies.25
As expected, the distance between the country of origin and the United
States has a negative impact on the emigration rate. The emigration rate is
also lower for countries that have high levels of GNP per capita. These
results, of course, are consistent with the predictions of the wealth-28
maximization framework. More interestingly, the second moment of the income
distribution (as predicted by the Roy model) plays an important role in the
determination of the emigration rate. In particular, countries with more
income inequality have lower emigration rates. This negative coefficient is
implied by the wealth-maximization framework if there is negative selection in
the immigrant pool. Negative selection requires that the correlation between
earnings in the U.S. and in the sending countries be sufficiently positive
and that the U.S. has less income inequality than the sending countries.
If, in addition, mean income in the U.S. exceeds mean income in sending
countries (adjusted for mobility costs), as income inequality in the home
country increases, the migration incentives of the most able decreases while
the poorest will still migrate. Hence the emigration rate declines due to the
withdrawal of high-income persons from the pooi of emigrants. The analysis of
the emigration rate, therefore, leads to results that are generally consistent
with the types of selection biases that have been documented in this paper.
V.Summary
What determines the (labor market) quality of foreign-born persons in the
United States? Most of the literature addresses this question simply by
assuming that immigrants are a "selectt' group, and that the selection mecha-
nism somehow sends the most able and the most ambitious persons in any country
of origin to the United States. This paper is an attempt to analyze both the
conceptual and empirical foundations for this type of assertion. Among the
major findings of the study are:
1. If potential emigrants are income-maximizers, foreign-born persons
in the United States need not be drawn from the most able and most ambitious
in the country of origin. Two conditions must be satisfied in order for29
positive selection to take place:(1) there is a strong positive correlation
between the earnings a worker may expect in the home country and the earnings
the same worker may expect in the U.S.; and (2) the U.S. has a more unequal
income distribution than the home country. If the income distribution in the
sending country is more unequal than that of the U.S. (and the correlation in
earnings is positive and strong), emigrants will be chosen from the lower tail
of the income distribution in the country of origin.
2.The empirical analysis of the earnings of immigrants from 41 differ-
ent countries using the 1970 and 1980 Census shows that there are strong
country-specific fixed effects in the (labor market) quality of foreign-born
persons. In particular, persons from Western European countries do quite well
in the United States, and their cohorts have exhibited a general increase in
earnings (relative to their measured skills) over the postwar period. On the
other hand, persons from less developed countries do not perform well in the
U.S. labor market and their cohorts have exhibited a general decrease in
earnings (relative to their measured skills) over the postwar period.
3.The empirical analysis of the variance in various dimensions of
immigrant incomes shows that a few variables describing political and economic
conditions in the various countries of origin explain over two-thirds of the
intercountry variance in the mean U.S. incomes of immigrants with the same
measured skills. Immigrants with high incomes in the U.S. relative to their
measure skills come from countries that have high levels of GNP, low levels of
income inequality, and politically competitive systems.30
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1
For a recent discussion of this identification problem see James
J. Heckman and Richard Robb (1983).
2
The model is formally identical to that presented in A.D. Roy's
(1951) study of the impact of self-selection in occupational choice on the
income distribution. The wealth-maximization hypothesis is also the corner-
stone of the human capital model proposed by Larry A. Sjaastad (1962).
However, both Sjaastad's work and the literature it engendered pay little
attention to the selection biases that are at the core of the Roy model.
3
Two important problems are ignored by the two-country setup.
First, it is likely that potential movers from any country j will have more
than one possible country of destination. Secondly, the probability that U.S.
native-born persons emigrate to other countries may not be negligible. These
possibilities are ignored in order to focus on the essential aspects of the
selection problem.
The Roy model has been recently used by Robert J. Willis and Sherwin
Rosen (1979) to analyze the types of selection biases created by the college
attendance decision. Heckman and Guilherme Sedlacek (1985) present a general-
ization of the Roy model and apply it to the problem of estimating market
wage functions.31
It is possible, of course, that the averageperson in country 0 has
ethnic or racial characteristics which are favored or penalized by the U.S.
labor market. Hence the mean income of (equally skilled) nativesmay not
equal p1. This possibility is ignored in the discussion that follows, but
it can be easily incorporated into the model.
6
A fourth case where Q0>0 and Q1<O is theoretically impossible since
it requires p>1.
The generalization of the model to allow for variable mobility costs
(it)showsthat the necessary conditions for negative selection remain un-
changed as long as mobility costs and earnings do not have an "excessiv&'
negative correlation.
8
It must be noted, however, that these data on income inequality do
not correspond exactly to the variances that are the primitive parameters of
the Roy model. In particular, a and describe the dispersion in
"opportunities" (for given socioeconomic characteristics).
This follows trivially from the fact that X is defined as E(xlx>z),
whre x is a standard normal random variable.
10
This discussion illustrates how differences in skill characteristics
can enter the Roy model. More generally, the earnings distributions in the






andthe emigration rate (for given characteristics X) is given by:
PPr{(c1-c0) >- [x(61-o0)-
Selectionwill occur not only on the basis of unobserved characteristics
(c), but also in terms of the socioeconomic variables X aslongas the two32
countries value these skills differently. Although the empirical analysis
below (by holding X constant) focuses on the selections in C,itwould be
very interesting to also investigate the types of selections generated in X.
In addition, the 1965 Act changed the emphasis in the allocation
of visas towards family reunification and away from occupational preferences.
This shift may well lead to an even steeper decline in the quality of immi-
grants admitted to the U.S.
12
The parameters ftand2 capture two kinds of cohort effects: (1)
differences in the skill composition of cohorts due to a secular trend in the
quality of immigrants; and (2) differences due to selective emigration of
foreign-born persons in the U.S. Little is known, however, about the selection
biases associated with return migration even though the Roy model can be
generalized to account for the possibility that individuals make "mistakes".
Unfortunately, U.S. data on the return migration of foreign-born persons is
basically non-existent, and hence this problem is ignored in what follows.
13Except perhaps for the coefficient of the immigrant dummy. This
coefficient gives the wage differential between the most recent cohort
of immigrants and the native-born population.
14
Provided that period effects on the immigrant/native wage differential
are negligible. This assumption is far from innocuous. Unfortunately, since
only two cross-sections are available, little can be done to test its validity.
15The two 1970 samples that are pooled are essentially independent
of each other. The only substantive difference between them --inthe context
of this study --isthat the set of persons for whom SMSA residence is defined
differs in the two samples. However, the coefficients of the SFISA dummy in
earnings functions estimated separately in the two samples are not statisti-
cally different from each other.33
16
The native-born extract is a .001 sample in the 1970 Census
and a .00042 sample in the 1980 Census.
17
The analysis is restricted to men aged 25-64 in either Censusyear.
This differs from the more common methodology of tracking the t?sameUmen over
time. It can be shown (Heckman and Robb, 1983) that if theunderlying para-
meters are constant over time it is unnecessary to track specific cohorts
across Censuses in order to identify the structure. In addition, the samples
exclude men who are self-employed. This restriction creates itsown set of
selection biases. However, an equally serious problem would arise if self-
employed men were included in the study and their incomes were analyzed
jointly with the wages of salaried men. Finally, the data exclude men who
had annual earnings under $1,000 in either of the Censusyears.
18 .
Onlytwo of the countries in the analysis have between 80 to 100
observations in the 1970 Census, an additional 11 countries have between
101 and 200 observations, 8 have between 201 and 300 observations, and 20
have more than 300 observations. Of course, the sample sizes in the 1980
Census are significantly larger.
19
The Cross-National Time-Series Archive was created by Professor
Arthur Banks and is available through the Inter-University Consortium for
Political and Social Research.
20
There is also the possibility that a country gained its freedom
during the 1950-1973 period. Only one country, however, falls in this
category (The Dominican Republic). To reduce the number of exogenous
variables, this country was pooled with the countries that were ?tfreet?
throughout the entire period.
21
The dependent variables in the "second stage" regressions presented
in this section are themselves estimated regression coefficients (or linear34
combinations thereof). Hence the disturbances in these regressions are hetero-
scedastic. Let y be the true value of the dependent variable (for country i)
in the second-stage regressions. The "true" model is given by:
yi = +
whereE(c1) =0and E() =cr.The variable y is unobserved, but is
estimated from the regressions in Section III, where =
y1
+v,E(v1) =0,
E(v) =cJ,and and v1 are assumed to be independent. The heteroscedasticity
arises because the estimated regressions are given by:
= + (c..-v.)=Z.+
whereE(p) =0and E(p) =+ cr.The OLS regression of the second stage
provides an estimate of ,andcombined with the estimates of available
from the first stage regressions, the parameter can be estimated by:
SSE -
1 cN-K
where SSE is the error sum of squares from the second stage regression and
N -Kis the number of degrees of freedom. The calculated is then used to
reestimate the second stage regression using generalized least squares.
22These results are consistent with the estimated gains to English
language proficiency reported in Walter McHanus, William Gould and Finis Welch
(1983).
23To further test the sensitivity of the results two additional
variables were introduced into the regression: the percent of the country's
labor force that is in agriculture, and the per capita school enrollment rate.
Both of these variables were highly correlated with GNP per capita, and in fact
became insignificant once GNP was controlled for. Their impact on the other
variables in the regression was negligible.
24
The probits were estimated using generalized Jeast squares. The
estimator, therefore, is minimum chi-squared and efficient.35
25
The regressions in Table 8 exclude theage at migration from the
list of regressors since this variable was calculated in thesubsample of
immigrants and may have little relationship to the age distribution of the
population in the country of origin.36
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Table 1
Summary of Comparative Statics Results
Positive SelectionNegative SelectionRefugee Sorting
Q0>O,Q1>O Q0<O,Q1<O Q0<O,Q1>O
aQ1/3p0:CompositionEffect none none none
Scale Effect + - ÷
aQ1/aa0:CompositionEffect -
ScaleEffect, z<O - - ÷
z>O + + -
aQ1/ap: Composition Effect + -
ScaleEffect, z<O
- + -
z>O + - +39
TABLE 2
INNIGRATION FLOWS TO TIlEUNITEDSTATES IN TIlE1951-1980 PERIOD
1951-1960 1971-1980
1951-1980 Immigration Immigrants Immigrants
Total Number As Percent of as Percent of as Percent of
Country of Birth (in l000s) 1980 Populationa1950 Populationa 1970 Populationa
Europe:
Austria 48.1 .6 .4 .1
Czechoslovakia 60.4 .4 .2 .1
Denmark 30.0 .6 .3 .1
France 90.1 .2 .1 .04
Germany 611.5 1.0 .7 .1
Greece 232.3 2.4 .6 1.1
Hungary 93.4 .9 .7 .1
Ireland 120.9 3.5 2.2 .5
Italy 524.8 .9 .4 .2
Netherlands 85.7 .6 .5 .1
Norway 45.1 1.1 .8 .1
Poland 244.9 .7 .5 .1
Portugal 204.2 2.1 .2 1.2
Romania 49.8 .2 .1 .1
Spain 71.2 .2 .04 .1
Sweden 41.9 .5 .3 .1
Switzerland 40.1 .6 .4 .1
United Kingdom 562.9 1.0 .4 .2
USSR 105.4 .04 .02 .02
Yugoslavia 147.0 .7 .4 .2
Asia and Africa:
China (Taiwan) 331.9 1.9 .4 1.4
Egypt 46.4 .1 .02 .1
India 211.1 .03 .001 .03
Iran 59.1 .2 .01 .2
Israel 48.1 1.3 .7 .9
Japan 131.1 .1 .05 .05
Korea 314.8 .8 .02 .8
Philippines 478.9 .9 .1 1.0
Americas:
Argentina 81.5 .3 .1 .3
Brazil 43.1 .04 .02 .01
Canada 676.4 2.8 2.0 .5
Colombia 165.5 .6 .4 .6
Cuba 611.9 6.3 1.5 3.2
Dominican Republic 251.9 4.3 .5 3.4
Ecuador 96.7 1.2 .3 .8
Guatemala 45.1 .7 .1 .5
Haiti 100.2 1.8 .1 1.3
Jamaica 221.7 10.3 .6 7.3
Mexico 1399.8 2.0 1.2 1.3
Panama 50.8 2.6 1.2 1.5
Trinidad & Tobago 88.0 8.0 .2 6.0
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (various issues).
aThe population base refers to thecountry of origin.40
TABLE 3






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1970 1980 Assimilation Change in
Country of Birth I I I.yZ at ylO Cohort Quality
Jamaica —.3322 .0165-.2594 .0097 -.00020 .0095 .0600
(-6.75) (4.06)(—9.33) (2.92) (-2.77) (2.24) (.64)
Mexico —.3307 .0191 -.4037 .0206 -.00031 .0078 -.1497
(—16.57) (14.80) (-34.72) (22.25) (—15.94)(4.16) (—3.61)
Panama —.3438 .0159-.2516 .0115-.00010 .0165 .1476
(-3.52) (2.31)(-4.35) (2.07) (-.88) (2.04) (.84)
Trinidad &
Tobago -.3091 .0187-.3257 .0211-.00024 .0158 .0013
(-4.02) (2.59)(-6.94) (3.70) (-1.95) (2.35) (.03)
aThe t-ratios are presented in parentheses. The cross-section regressions hold constant








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DETERMINANTSOF TUE ENTRYWAGEDIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN
TUE 1979IMMIGRANT COHORT ANI) NATIVESa



































































£n (per capita GNP) - - .1164 .1015
(4.57) (3.77)
Country in Asia or
Africa - - - - .1145
(—1.58)
Country in North or
.
South America - - .0640
(-.73)
R2 .504 .681 .808 .82646
TABLE 6
DETERNINANTS OF TILE RATEOFASSINILATIONa
Country of Origin Regression
Characteristics 1 2 3 4
Intercept .0076 -.0240 -.0237 -.0280
(2.96) (—3.88) (-1.50) (-2.32)
Politically -.0029 -.0068 -.0068 -.0091
Competitive (-1.06) (-2.66) (-2.60) (-4.28)
System
Recent Loss of .0063 .0029 .0030 .0021
Freedom (1.81) (1.21) (1.15) (1.06)
Number of .0008 .0006 .0006 .0008
Assassinations (2.68) (2.36) (2.14) (3.07)
Income Inequality -.0001 -.00002 -.00002 .0002
(—.50) (—.11) (—.10) (.90)
Distance from U.S. .0003 .0003 -.0027
(.74) (.70) (-2.89)
English Proficiency .0138 .0138 .0122
(3.27) (3.20) (3.70)
Mean Age at Migration .0009 .0009 .0009
(4.28) (3.95) (4.72)
£n (per capita GNP) -.00002 .0021
(—.01) (1.83)
Country in Asia or .0151
Africa (5.11)
Country in North or -.0080
South America (-2.08)
R2 .302 .704 .704 .842
aThe t-ratios are presented in parentheses.47
TABLE 7
DETERMINANTS OF THERATEOF CHANGE IN COHORT QUALITY
Country of Origin Regression
Characteristics 1 2 3 4
Intercept -.3194 -.9951 -1.1779 -2.2202
(—3.19) (—3.97) (—4.08) (—4.69)
Politically
Competitive
System .1760 .1075 .0712 .0630
(2.54) (1.60) (.97) (.70)
Recent Loss of
Freedom .1256 .1468 .1272 .1310
(1.67) (2.16) (1.81) (1.33)
Number of
Assassinations .0077 .0156 .0122 .0256
(1.19) (2.32) (1.69) (2.00)
Rate of Change in
Central Government
Expeüditures .0698 .0699 .0641 -.0099
(1.60) (1.75) (1.60) (—.21)
Rate of Change in Per
Capita GNP 4.7010 3.0956 1.1567 -1.5321
(2.27) (1.60) (.46) (—.50)
2n (per capita GNP) .0889 .1186 .2443
(1.93) (3.22) (4.15)
Country in Asia or
Africa .1374
(1.42)
Country in North or
South America .0274
(.41)
Change in Quota .0034
(2.26)
R2 .284 .418 .453 .581
aThe t-ratios are presented inparentheses.48
TABLE 8








































aThe dependent variable is the probability that an individual migrated to
the United States in 1951-1980, and is given by the second column of Table 2.
The t-ratios are presented in parentheses.









2n (per capita GNP)
Country in Asia or Africa
Country in North or South America
x2 98.4549
Figure 1
+ it J.tl